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The study of regime theory is familiar to any student of International Relations. Since the publication of a 
collection of articles in the 36th volume of the academic journal International Organization – in which distinguished 
specialists thoroughly explored the concept of international regimes –, almost every study on the subject quoted 
Stephen Krasner’s definition: international regimes are implicit or explicit “principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (1982, p. 1).
Oran R. Young (1982, p. 277) also defined International Regimes as “social institutions governing the actions of 
those interested in specifiable activities.” International regimes are possible to recognize not only by their descriptive 
account, but also by the “underlying principles of order and meaning that shape the manner of their formation and 
transformation” (Ruggie, 1982, p. 196).
Since those basic concepts were outlined, studies have multiplied to address how international regimes have 
been created or transformed in areas such as the economy, the environment and international security. In 1982, 
John Gerard Ruggie, a well-known International Relations scholar, wrote an article to analyze the formation and 
transformation of the international regimes on money and trade after World War II.1 He introduced the term 
“embedded liberalism” to describe the underlying structure of the postwar economic order.
According to Ruggie, this order was constructed on a broad international consensus: intergovernmental 
collaboration and market integration were necessary to promote balance of payments equilibrium in a multilateral 
environment – but States should retain sufficient autonomy to pursue domestic economic stability, such as full 
employment policies. States should cooperate in devising and implementing international economic institutions. 
Nevertheless, governments also sought to maintain autonomy to pursue production strategies, employment policies 
and social welfare protection. Embedded liberalism thus signified a compromise between excessive free markets 
and excessive protectionism. It implied that the postwar economic order reflected a consensus upon core social 
values, ideas, and objectives – which, in turn, were reflected in the rules and decision-making procedures that were 
established to make such consensus work. 
Ruggie’s concept of embedded liberalism also implied concerns about the means by which this compromise 
could be, or has been, altered or jeopardized. He acknowledged the significance of power as a potential source of 
change, but stressed the “shared social purpose” as the more significant determinant. In the author’s perspective, 
significant changes in the international macroeconomic order stems more from changing social ideas and ideology 
than from external economic dynamics and shifts in the international distribution of power. The concept of embedded 
liberalism challenged alternative explanations for the creation and sustaining of the international regimes on money 
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and trade, particularly by those that emphasized the role of American leadership and power. For the author, there 
was a fundamental difference between changes in the principles and norms (normative framework) and changes 
in rules and procedures (instruments). In this sense, the normative framework of the monetary and trade regime 
would not necessarily be jeopardized by what many perceived to be the decline of American power after the Bretton 
Woods system collapsed in the early 1970s.
Ruggie suggested that, after the breakdown of the system of fixed exchange rates, many of the changes that 
have occurred in the regimes for money and trade have been norm-governed changes instead of reflecting radical 
transformations in the social purpose of those regimes. Yet there were huge debates about how the new international 
monetary and financial structures would restore the balance between market integration and national independence 
in macroeconomic policies. Such debates are still recurrent in international affairs. But they become more relevant 
for political leaders after severe economic crises, like the one that hit the U.S. and the world economy in 2008. 
After the financial crisis, what have been the consequences for the embedded liberalism compromise and for 
the global economic governance? Is it possible now to track only changes in economic dynamics and shifts in the 
international distribution of power or also changing social ideas and ideologies?
The end of the postwar macroeconomic order
The postwar monetary system of fixed exchange rates, which lasted until the early 1970s, was designed to provide 
both domestic policy autonomy and international monetary stability (Rieden & Broz, 2001). The system was based 
on the following principles: fixed or pegged exchange rates along with sufficient flexibility to enable individual States 
to deal with extraordinary situations (including the pursuit of full employment policies). The member countries 
agreed to peg their currencies to the dollar – which, in turn, was pegged to the gold. The IMF was responsible for 
managing the system through approval of exchange rates adjustments and could also make its monetary reserves 
available to countries in economic trouble. The World Bank was also created to promote foreign investments.
Although this system functioned well for almost thirty years, in the early 1970s the increasing dollar’s lost 
of value became a central issue in the world economy. The Vietnam War and the launching of the Great Society 
Program by the Johnson Administration (1963-1969) augmented the global rate of inflation and thus jeopardized 
the value of the dollar (Gilpin, 2001). In the following years, irregular American macroeconomic policies led to the 
devaluation of the dollar and to the subsequent collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements in 1971 – when the dollar 
became no longer pegged to the gold and currencies became free to float. The system had thus changed from one 
based on fixed exchange rates to one based on flexible rates.
The end of the Bretton Woods’ monetary agreement changed the rules and decision-making procedures of 
the international regimes on money and trade – but did not modify their social purpose. The embedded liberalism 
compromise continued to prevail, but under a different structure. Rules and procedures had changed – but not 
principles. The balance between market integration and domestic autonomy had to be restored in a new equilibrium.
 After the end of the Bretton Woods’ fixed exchange rates system, the embedded liberalism compromise was 
adapted to a new framework. Globalization was in the making. On one hand, freeing financial markets facilitated 
reorganization and transformation of international business. It also increased international interdependence through 
capital mobility, trade flows, globally-integrated corporate ownership, and foreign investments. On the other, the 
integration of national capital markets made it possible for developing countries to borrow funds abroad to invest 
domestically and thus increase their governments’ capabilities to promote growth. The floating exchange rate system 
also represented the triumph of the Central Banks as the main authorities of the international monetary regime.
The Bretton Woods rule-based international monetary system was politically replaced by an informal political 
agreement among the dominant economic powers (G-7). The new monetary structure was based on cooperative, 
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and sometimes not so cooperative, efforts of central bankers and finance ministers to stabilize currency values. But 
the new equilibrium between free markets and national autonomy also proved to be unstable. The international 
financial revolution that promoted market integration was inherently unsteady and subject to serious crises. The 
volatility of capital flows and the debt problems of many less developed countries in the 1970s and early 1980s 
created many financial crises and macroeconomic imbalances – which shaped the dynamics that led to the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009.
The roots of the 2008 financial crisis
Any clear-cut explanation of the financial crisis of 2008 would be too simplistic. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
outline the major trends behind the events that led to the financial breakdown of 2008 – especially those accounting 
to global macroeconomic imbalances that were developed in the world economy since the 1970s. 
My story of the crisis starts with a simple lesson of international macroeconomics: an international monetary 
regime must determine the method by which national economies will restore equilibrium (i.e., reduce a deficit 
or a surplus) in their international accounts (balance of payments). Every adjustment policy results in economic 
costs, and some methods of adjustment are considerably more costly for individual economies and for the overall 
world economy than are others. But the bottom line is simple: if some countries generate surplus, others must run 
huge deficits. With few exceptions, a deficit country cannot continue drawing down its reserves for very long, and 
eventually the debtor country must take measures to eliminate the cause of the imbalance – and pay its debt.
If debts are to exist, some sectors of a national economy must spend more than their incomes. This is intuitively 
obvious: if a collection of people spend more than their income on goods and services, they must be receiving loans 
or investments from elsewhere to finance the excess of their imports over their exports. This was the reality for 
many developing countries after the financial revolution of the 1970s. The emergence of an international financial 
market accelerated deregulation of domestic financial systems, removal of capital controls in a number of countries, 
and greatly increased size and velocity of global financial flows. It enabled developing countries to borrow funds 
for economic development – or, more specifically, to adjust their balance of payment deficits. But it made those 
countries vulnerable to external shocks and to sudden swings in investor’s preferences.
The erratic behavior of global capital markets and the risky policies undertaken by governments of developing 
countries resulted in many financial crises: the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s; the Tequila Crisis, 
which started in Mexico in 1994-95 and spread elsewhere in Latin America; and, mostly important of all, the “rolling 
crisis” that started in Thailand in June 1997 and immediately spread to East Asia, and then to Russia and Brazil, 
in 1998 and 1999 (Wolf, 2010). What made these systemic crises so important were their long-term effects and a 
new adjustment in the emerging world growth model. After such crises, the developing economies effectively said 
“enough” and ever since, in the aggregate, have been running current account surplus and accumulating international 
reserves. “Export to grow” became the new rule.
In the 1990s, the plentiful surplus savings of the developing world – soon to be augmented by the surpluses 
of Germany and the oil-rich countries – was available to fund spending for someone else. According to Raghuran 
Rajan, professor of finance in the University of Chicago and former chief economist of the IMF, that “someone else” 
was corporations in industrial countries that were on an investment spree, especially in the areas of information 
technology and communications (Rajan, 2010). This boom in investment – now called the dot-com bubble – came 
to an end in the early 2000s, when these corporations scaled back dramatically on investment because of losses 
they endured after the bubble burst. As a result, the U.S. economy slowed and new incentives had to be created to 
stimulate an economic recovery.
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Professor Rajan (2010, p. 5) stressed that the Federal Reserve (Fed) had to cut interest rates sharply to energize 
activities in sectors of the economy that were interest sensitive. According to him, as the corporations had invested 
too much during the dot-com bubble years, they had little incentive to do so again. Instead, the low interest rates 
prompted U.S. consumers to buy houses, which raised house prices and led to another surge of investments in the 
real estate market. The U.S. financial sector stepped in to create financial instruments that could bridge the gap 
between an overstimulated United States and the rest of the world. New credit was made available for the so-called 
subprime segments and consumption boomed. A new investment bubble was then created, but this time in the 
housing market. New housing construction and existing housing sales provided jobs and served as the necessary 
guarantee for new financial investments, especially for subprime mortgages. Rising house prices provided the capital 
to refinance old loans and to finance new consumption. Foreign countries also took their share in this euphoria. 
They could emerge from their economic slump by exporting to the apparently insatiable U.S. consumer, while also 
lending the United States the money to pay for those imports.
The rest of story is well-known: when the Fed raised interest rates and halted the house price rise, bad debt 
started to show, risky investments started to be priced again, and worries about funding leveraged institutions started 
to spread. The stage was set for panic, and in the end that was what hit, starting in the summer of 2007 and reaching 
its peak in the autumn of 2008, when three of the largest U.S. investment banks either went bankrupt (Lehman 
Brothers) or were sold at fire sale prices to other banks (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch).
Has the system failed?
What have been the consequences of such developments for the embedded liberalism compromise? First of all, 
it is important to acknowledge that such compromise has not been abandoned, of course. It is the balance between 
more market integration and more national autonomy that continues to shift – and now more drastically.
The age of financial liberalization was, in short, an age of crises. Freedom of capital movements has complicated, 
and some believe, reduced macroeconomic policy autonomy and the ability of individual governments to control 
their own economies. International financial flows have also become an important determinant of exchange rates 
and a cause of erratic movements in currency values. Many developing countries believed that they needed to restore 
more capital controls and shield themselves from external shocks through enormous reserve accumulations. They 
started to advocate regulatory mechanisms for international finance movements. Mostly important: they refused 
to allow substantial private capital inflows to shift them from their determination to run very large current account 
surpluses. But the development of international finance has also increased interdependence of trade, monetary, and 
others aspects of the international economy. The “export to grow” model chosen by many developing countries is 
not so autonomous, after all. They have become much dependent on consumption elsewhere.
Emerging economies, developed countries like Germany and Japan, oil-rich countries, they all created a very 
efficient export-oriented manufacturing sector. Government intervention and artificially competitive exchange rates 
have guaranteed the necessary support for their companies’ success in foreign markets. But also in many of those 
countries, domestic-oriented sectors managed to limit external competition. As a result, low domestic demand from 
those exporting countries puts pressure on other countries to step up spending. According to Rajan (2010, p. 10), 
“because the exporters have excess goods to supply, countries like Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
– which ignore growing household indebtedness and even actively encourage it – and countries like Greece – which 
lack the political will to control government populism and union demands – tend to get a long rope.”
The financial crisis of 2008 revealed how fragile the world economic equilibrium was. Excess savings were only 
possible for some countries because others were running excessive spending. The crisis also affected what Martin 
Wolf, chief editor of Financial Times, has called “the deal”: the post-second-world-war political/economic settlement 
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which, in the United States, was centered on full employment and high individual consumption; and, in Europe, 
was centered on state-provided welfare.21 
The financial crisis also affected the “export to grow” model that so successfully has been applied in develo-
ping countries. What is more: it affected the embedded liberalism compromise. On one hand, there’s a call for the 
reduction of government intervention and for fiscal austerity in developed countries. On the other, many developing 
countries struggle to keep the export-led growth model intact. And such a battle has been taken to the governance 
of the world economy.
Changes in the global economic governance: from multilateralism 
to multipolarity in the G-20
After the financial collapse of 2008, a collective international effort was set to stimulate domestic demand and to 
constraint governments from resorting to protectionism and currency devaluations to alleviate a nation’s economic 
difficulties at the expense of other countries. In November 2008, the leaders of the world’s largest economies met 
in Washington and designated their group, the G-20, as the primary forum for global economic cooperation. The 
leaders of the G-20 imposed themselves the task to develop a coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus in response 
to the crisis. It was crucial to include emerging economies in the discussions, since the G-7 leaders needed them to 
be part of the compromises that would be settled to address the financial crisis.
When the world economy had hit rock bottom after the financial crisis, there was an urgent need to inject demand 
into the world economy through fiscal and monetary stimulus. The G-20 meetings can rightfully be credited with 
having facilitated a more coordinated global fiscal expansion, with countries such as Japan and Germany, reluctant 
at first, joining the United States and China in what ended up as a simultaneous and strong worldwide expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy (Bradford & Lim, 2011). The firsts meetings, held in Washington in November 2008 
and London in April 2009, produced “an agreement on joint monetary and fiscal expansion, increased funding for 
the IMF, and set new rules for financial institutions” (Bremmer & Roubini, 2011). Those agreements came mainly 
because there was a shared feeling that the harsh effects of the crisis needed to be addressed immediately – and that 
no country was safe and sound from them. 
The balance then looked to be leaning more towards markets integration. Governments seemed to be willing 
to cooperate, instead of resorting to claims for more autonomy in macroeconomic affairs. But as the economic 
recovery began, the sense of crisis abated in some countries. The Toronto summit, held in June 2010, highlighted 
the first tensions between the G-20 members. The agenda was filled with divisions among them, including a growing 
divide on the question of global or national economic regulation. The United States and Europe also could not agree 
on whether to focus on stimulus spending or deficit reduction strategies. Greece’s sovereign debt crisis had forced 
Europeans to focus on deficit reduction as a way to ensure market confidence. The U.S. administration remained 
concerned about jobs and growth.
It didn’t take long for other conflicts start to emerge. Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini (2011) pointed out, in 
an article in Foreign Affairs magazine, that “conflicts over trade liberalization have recently pitted the United States, 
the European Union, Brazil, China, India, and other emerging economies against one another as each government 
looked to protect its own workers and industries, often at the expense of outsiders.” Similar commercial conflicts 
have stalled the Doha negotiation talks. Before the G-20 summit in Seoul, a “currency war” broke out. The U.S. 
policy of monetary expansionism – also called “quantitative easing” – resulted in an outflow of dollars to emerging 
markets, causing currency appreciation in developing countries and thus harming their exports.3 China was also 
2 Available at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/39c67712-8eb1-11df-8a67-00144feab49a.html#axzz1lkycGSWo>. Access on January 23, 2012.
3 Bremmer & Roubini, A G-Zero World (Foreign Affairs Magazine, vol. 90, n. 2).
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manipulating the value of its currency to artificially devaluated levels to keep its “export to grow” model from 
damages.4 Many countries deemed those practices “unfair” and even “clueless”.5
Despite such conflicts, the emergence of the G-20 can be seen as a defining moment in the development of 
global governance towards looser and more informal cooperation frameworks (Jokela, 2011, p. 7-8). The group can 
be described as the main current guardian of the embedded liberalism compromise. And indeed it is.
The formation of the G20 and its achievements – governance reforms at the World Bank and the IMF; new 
global rules on banking supervision, known as Basel III; coordinated stimulus packages, and many others – suggest a 
real expansion of multilateral cooperation and political coordination among key actors. But several obstacles remain 
for a strong international compromise on macroeconomic adjustment. It was very easy to get politicians together 
in the face of a crisis and to get governments to ease on fiscal and monetary policies. The real difficulties emerge 
when countries need to undertake politically painful reforms that might even seem to be more oriented towards 
helping other countries in the short run at the expense of some domestic groups.
Those difficulties have been vast. According to Bremmer and Roubini (2011):
Today, the United States lacks the resources to continue as the primary provider of global public goods. 
Europe is fully occupied for the moment with saving the eurozone. Japan is likewise tied down with 
complex political and economic problems at home. None of these powers’ governments has the time, 
resources, or domestic political capital needed for a new bout of international heavy lifting. Meanwhile, 
there are no credible answers to transnational challenges without the direct involvement of emerging 
powers such as Brazil, China, and India. Yet these countries are far too focused on domestic development 
to welcome the burdens that come with new responsibilities abroad.
The outcome of this new cooperation agreement may be a multipolarity system without multilateralism, as the 
main powers and the newly empowered States go their own way – and as macroeconomic adjustment gets harder 
to achieve. 
Conclusions
Ruggie asserted that the embedded liberalism compromise was a central feature of the postwar international 
regimes on money and trade. It continues to be. There has been no rupture within the ideational framework of 
such regimes. Rules and procedures (instruments) have changed, but principles and norms (normative framework) 
have not. Presumably, the new instruments that have emerged would be better adapted to the new power situation. 
Unfortunately, such new instruments have proven to be not enough to respond to the challenges imposed by global 
imbalances.
Working out the distribution of the costs of adjustment among deficit and surplus countries is at the heart of 
solving the adjustment problems. But we are very early at developing a functioning global economic order that can 
promote such outcome. The rules of the game are not clear at all. When does a macroeconomic policy of a country 
create global harm? As Professor Rajan (2010, p. 211) asked, “when the Fed cuts interest rates and thus sets off a 
global wave of risk taking, do countries elsewhere have the right to protest? Could the Fed not say it focused only 
on U.S. economic conditions, in accordance to its primary responsibility? When China imposes controls over capital 
flows and intervenes in exchange markets to keep its currency from appreciating, should it be considered an unfair 
competitive advantage?” In other words: how to impose sanctions on countries that rely on greater autonomy in 
4 See note 3 above.
5 See note 3 above.
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macroeconomic policies? How to balance then the equilibrium between market integration and national autonomy? 
How to manage the embedded liberalism compromise?
The birth of the G-20 reflected the emergence of a multipolar order as well as the recognition of increasing 
interdependence among developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, politics have always been a local business 
– and there’s no constituency for the global economy. There are currently no great political ambitions to bolster the 
global economy by taking painful domestic reforms that would promote stability internationally. What still prevails 
is the embedded liberalism compromise – under a new structure, and threatened by new global imbalances.
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Abstract
In 1982, John Gerard Ruggie published a study of the international trade and monetary regimes in which he 
introduced the concept of “embedded liberalism”. This article describes how the concept of embedded liberalism 
has been altered or jeopardized after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
Resumo
Em 1982, John Gerard Ruggie publicou um estudo dos regimes monetário e comercial internacionais em que 
ele introduziu o conceito de “liberalismo embutido”. Esse artigo descreve como o conceito de Ruggie tem sido 
alterado ou comprometido depois da crise financeira de 2007-2009.
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